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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

-------------

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

GUY V. RONNEBURG,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF

.

Case No. 18116·

NATURE OF THE CASE

The Appellant, Salt Lake City, seeks to have this Court
uphold the constitutionality of both the City's

ordinan~e,

Section 19-3-9, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, which
prohibits persons under twenty-one years of age from remaining in
or about a tavern, and its right, under the police power, to
s~ch

enact

an ordinance.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS

The Defendant, Guy V. Ronneburg, was charged and convicted

in the Fifth Circuit Court for allowing minors in a tavern in
violation of Section 19-3-9 of the Revised Ordinances
Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended.

o~

Salt

Respondent-Ronneburg

thereafter appealed his conviction to the Third Judicial District
Court.
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The district court, through the Honorable Judge Bryant H.
Groft, ruled that the enactment of the subject ordinance was
beyond the power of the City and was therefore unconstitutional,
on the grounds of being arbitrary and unreasonable.
The City then instituted this appeal to this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts of this case demonstrate the following:
The Defendant-Ronneburg was employed as the food and

· 1.

beverage manager by the Ramada Inn located in Salt Lake City.
( T-6, 2 6)

On the evening of November 6, 1980, the defendant, as

2.

the acting manager of the motel and was -in charge of the motel
premises, including a tavern known as "The
located on the premise of the motel.

Study~-·,

which is

(T-6, 26)

During the time the defendant was in charge of the

3.

premises, a fashion show was conducted on the premises of The
------

---·--·----------·--·

Study, which is the possessor of a Class "C" beer license. issued
by the City.
4.

(T 4-5)

The Salt Lake City Police Department had been notified

that persons under the age of twenty-one .had been participating
in the fashion shows held in the tav~rn.

1

Police were present on

1H6lders of Class "C" Beer licenses are commonly referred to as
bars, taverns, or lounges. Such establishments may sell draft
beer on their premises and are required to keep from their
premises persons under the age of twenty-one. See Sections
19-2-6 and 19-3-9, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1 .--....--1 9 6 5 , as amended , a t ta_c_h_e_d----a-s--A,__p_p_e_n-=d:""'"li,_.x_e_s_-n"~A-=-"=---a-n-d~~..~B~'T""'
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the evening of November 6th, and ascertained that two ir:rlividuals
participating in the fashion show held in the tavern were under
the age of twenty-one.
offense.
5.

Both persons received citations for said

(T 4-5)
After the police officers had ascertained from the

defendant that he was in charge of, and had responsibility for,
the premises, the defendant was issued a citation for permitting
persons under twenty-one years of age to remain in a tavern.

(T-

5-7)
6.

The defendant-was tried on the 9th day of December, 1980

in the Fifth Circuit Court and was found guilty of permitting
persons under the age of twenty-one to remain in a tavern, in
violation of Section 19-3-9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, Utah·.
7.

(T-1, 26)

The defendant thereafter appealed his conviction to the

Third Judicial District Court.

On appeal, the Honorable- Judge

Bryant Croft, sua s:ponte, raised the issues of the City's power
to enact a strict liability ordinance and its power to prohibit
persons under the age of twenty-one from the premises of
taverns.

Finding the City had neither power, the District Court

held that Section 19-3-9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, Utah, was unconstitutional on grounds of being arbitrary
and unreasonable.

(The memorandum decision of Judge Croft is
-3-
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attached hereto. as Appendix "C".)'
8.

The Appellant City thereafter filed the current appeal

with the Utah Supreme Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ENACTMENT
ORDINANCES OF
TUTES A VALID
POWER AND THE
ALL RESPECTS.

A.

OF SECTION 19-3-9, REVISED
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CONSTIEXERCISE OF THE CITY'S POLICE
ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL IN

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN BOTH
SPECIFIC AND GENERAL POWERS TO REGULATE THE
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH BEER MAY BE SOLD
WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTIONS.

Section 19-3-9, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1965, as amended, is one of a number of ordinances enacted by the
City in order to regulate the sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages within the City's limits.

This section provides:

"It shal 1 be unlawful and sh al 1 cons ti tu te an offense
of s tr i ct 1-iab i.l i. ty. _£or_ __.an_y__ iice n s e e_ __of a Class_'~_,__or____ ---Class "D", license for the sale of beer or any
operator, agent, or employee of such licensee to permit
any person under the age of twenty-one years to remain
in or about such licensed premise."
I

On appeal,

the district cou!t held this ordinance unconsti-

tutional in part, on the basis that the City did not have the
power to enact an ordinance prohibiting persons under the age of
twenty-one from being present on the premises of a tavern.
The court so held notwithstanding the provisions of Section

10-8-47, Utah Code Annotated,. 1953, as amended, which provides in
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part:
"They [cities] may prevent intoxication . . • and may
prohibit the sale, giving away or furnishing of
intoxi.cating liquors or narcotics, or of tobacco to any
person under twenty-one years of age. . . • "
The district court strictly construed this statute and ruled
that it did not include the right of the City to also prohibit
individuals under the age of twenty-one from being on certain
premises where such beverages are sold.·
The Court also reviewed Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, the City's general welfare clause, which
gives municipalities authority to enact al 1 ordinances necessary

and proper to provide for the peace and. general welfare of the
City. 2

However, the district court was not persuaded that the

two statutes together gave the cities an expanded right to enact the
present ordinance.

It therefore declared the ordinance invalid.

The City respectfully submits that based upon the above two

---

··--

~0-8-84,

s ta tu tes, ·10-s-·47 and

ordinances. in question.

i.t does have power to enact the

An additional basis for such power is

found in Section 32-4-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
J

which provides in relevant part:
"Cities and towns within their corporate limits, . • •
shall have power to license, tax, regulate or prohibit
the sale of light beer, at retail, in bottles or
draft; • • • • " (emphasis added)

2Th e prov1s1ons
· ·
·
1 o- 8 - 8 4 are se t
of Section

f or th

i· n

Append i' x "D" •
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Interpreting the powers given to a city under the abovecited statute, this Court has held that "since a city can
regulate or prohibit the sale [of beer] entirely, certainly it
can impose any reasonable regulations thereon.

11

Triangle Oil

Inc., v. North Salt Lake, 609 P.2d 1338, 1339 (1980),· emphasis
added.

In finding that North Salt Lake's restriction regarding

the number of outlets the.City had authorized for the sale of
beer, this Court held:
"In relation to the problem dealt herein, it is
generally recognized that because beer is a beverage
containing alcohol, its sale is sufficiently related to
the public health, morals and safety, that it is
subject to regulation under the police power . . • • "
(emphasis added)
Id. at 1339.
The court concluded its opinion with the following language:

" • • • Because of the seriousness of judicial responsi-.
bility in having the final word in its inter-relationship with other departments and institutions of government, it has been found to be wise and proper judicial
policy to exercise its powers with restraint, and not
to intrude into or interfere with the discretionary
functions or the policies of other departments of ________ _
government. Accordingly, the courts generally will not
so interfere with the actions of a city council unless
its action is outside of its authority or is so whollt
discordant to reason and justice th~t its action must
be deemed ca;er icious and arbitrary and thus in
violation of complainant's rights."
(emphasis added)
Id. at 1339, 1340.
Since the City has the power to absolutely prohibit the sale
of beer within its corporate limits, the City may also enact
reasonable regulations pertaining to the sale of such
beverages.

It is beyond dispute that local governments, under
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the police power, can restrict the sale of beer within close
proximity of schools, and churches, 3 they may also under such
power and the Twenty-first Amendment, prohibit certain conduct,
otherwise permitted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on
premises which allow the sale or

con~umption

of intoxicating

liquors. 4
The City submits that inasmuch as it is contrary to state

law to sell beer to any person under the age of twenty-one, that
the subject ordinance is a reasonable extension of its power to
prohibit persons under the age·of twenty-one from frequenting
certain establishments holding Class "C" beer licenses which have
as their principal business activity the selling of beer.

Finally, the City maintains_ that the decision .of the
district court is totally in error due to its failure to
recognize the principles enunciated in this Court's decision in
State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 {Utah, 1980).

In Hutchinson,

the Court upheld the right of Salt Lake County to enact an
ordinance under the general welfare power to regulate elections
'

even though the County had not been given a specific grant of
authority to enact such an ordinance.

In so doing, the Court

overturned the Dillon Rule, which had long been the law of this
3 section 32-4-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, attached
as Append ix "E".

4california v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
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state, and which provided that all. powers granted to local
governments should be strictly construed.

The court held:

"When the state has granted general welfare power to
local governments, those governments have independent
authority apart from, and in addition to, speciffc
grants of authority to pass ordinances which are
reasonably and appropriately related to the objectives
of that power, i.e. providing for the public safety,·
health, morals and welfare.
(citations omitted) And
the courts will not interfere with the legislative
choice of the means elected unless it is arbitrary, or
is directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the
policy of, the state or federal laws or the
constitution of this state or of the United States.
Specific grants of authority may serve to limit the
means available under the general welfare clause, for
some limitation may be imposed on the exercise of power
by directing the use of power in a particular manner.
But specific grants should generally be construed with
reasonable latitude in light of the broad language of
the general welfare clause which may supplement the
power found in a specific delegation.
"Broad construction of the powers of counties and
cities is consistent with the current needs of local
governments. The Dillon Rule of strict construction is
antithetical to effective and efficient local and state
government."
Id. at 1126.·
---while-- paying' lip- -service to -this Court's - holding in·
Hutchinson, the district court nevertheless strictly construed
both the specific grant of authority given to cities to prohibit
the sale of ·beer to persons under twenty-one and also the City's
general welfare clause.

The district court struck down the

ordinance as an ultra vires act of the City.

The City maintains

that such a decision is simply contrary to the enabling statutes
cited above and to this Court's holding in Hutchinson.
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B.

LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS ARE PRESUMED TO BE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY
OVERTURNED.

The decision of the district court is even more troubling in

view of the ease with which the district court came to the
conclusion that the subject ordinance was unconstitutional.

It

has long been the law of the state that legislative enactments
are presumed to be constitutional and will be overturned only if
the statute or ordinance is clearly in conflict with a higher law
or the constitution.

This Court recently reaffirmed this

principle in Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, (Utah, 1981 ) . . In
upholding the constitutionality of a state statute, the Court
held:
"There are certain principles of law relating to the
validity of statutes which have a bearing on the
problem of constitutionality here presented. The first
and foundational one is that the prerogative of the
legislature as the creators of the law, is to be
respected. Consequently, its enactments are accorded a
presumption of validity; and the courts do not strike
down a legislative act unless fh~ interests of justice
in the particular case before it require doing so
because the act is clearly in conflict with the higher
law, as set forth in the Constitution." Id. at 80.
The ordinance in question was enacted pursuant to the
authority delegated to the City by the legislature, and springs
from the police power.

This is a power inherent in the state to

safeguard the general welfare of its citizens.

Laws passed

pursuant to it are purely local in nature and sensitive to the.
particular needs of the people.

This court has enunciated the
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following rule regarding judicial interference with legislative
enactments made pursuant to local police powers:
"The act must be upheld and enforced unless it
manifestly bears no relation to public health, morals,
welfare, or other legitimate objects of the police
power, or, if it does bear such relation, unless it is
a plain invasion of constitutional rights." State v.
Packer, 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 at 1016 (Utah, 1931)
The legislature has declared that it is unlawful for a
person under the age of twenty-one to buy or consume alcoholic
beverages.

Bars and taverns have as their primary activity the

selling of draft beer.

It is certainly reasonable to restrict

those persons who cannot lawfully buy or consume alcoholic
beverages from such premises.·
Such a regulation is even more sustainable in light of the
fact that adult entertainment is often provided on such
in the form of "go-go dancers".

prem~ses

The environment, atmosphere, and

in many cases, the clientele of bars and taverns simply make such
places--not

··suitab-le-~·-~for

the -pr-esence---- of minors- and- -under-aged

persons.
In fact,

the legislature
has prohibited taverns and bars
' ...

from being located in proximity to churches and schools--places_
where minors are likely to be.
The City has further restricted such establishments to
commercial districts, away from its residential neighborhoods and
parks in order to preserve the integrity of the latter and reduce
the influence of bars and alcohol in the community.
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Regulations pertaining to the sale of beer are without
question permissible and desirable under the police power.

In

contrast, however, the district court has failed to give any
reason, other than its feeling that the state law prohibiting the
sale of beer to persons under age twenty-one should be strictly
construed, why the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable in
keeping such persons from bars where draft.beer is sold.
As demonstrated above, the ordinance clearly bears a
relationship to the public· welfare by regulating the sale of beer
in the community.

Section 19-3-9, Revised Ordinances of Salt

Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended, is one of a number of regulations established by ordinance which serves to restrict the
influence of bars and taverns from schools, churches, parks, and
under-aged persons.

The ordinance constitutes a legitimate and

reasonable exercise of the police power delegated to the C.i ty and
its validity should be upheld.
C.

THE CITY HAS EXPRESS AUTHORITY TO ENACT STRICT
LIABILITY ORDINANCES.

The district court recognized the right of the state to
enact strict liability statutes which _dispense with an intent or
mens rea requirement.

The validity of strict liability statutes

has long been upheld as an exception to the general rule
requiring intent as an element of criminal statutes.

See

Morissette v. U.S. 342 U.S. 246 (1951} and U.S. v. Bailey, 440
U.S. 394 (1979).
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The United States Supreme Court has stressed both the
state's power to enact strict liability statutes as well as the
limitations of such power:
"Still, it is doubtless competent for the State to
create strict criminal liabilities by defining criminal
offenses without any element of scienter • • • though
there is precident in this Court that this power is not
without limitations." Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 150 (1959)
Utah has provided for the enactment of strict liability
statutes in the State Criminal Code, Section 76-1-101, et seq.,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

Section 76-2-101, provides:

"No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct
is prohibited by law and:

1.. He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
or with criminal negligence with respect to each
element of the offense as the definition of the offense
requires; or
11

"2.
His acts constitute an offense involving
strict liability.

"Every offense not involving strict liability shall
require a culpable mental state, and when the def inition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental
state, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice
to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall
involve strict liability only when a statute defining .
the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to
impose strict liability for the conduct by the use of
the phrase 'strict liability' or other terms of similar
import."
The district court, however, ruled that these two statutes
were only applicable to the state legislature, and that like
authority was not afforded to local governments under these
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statutes.

Finding.no other enabling legislation specifying that

municipalities may enact strict liability ordinances, including
the general welfare power, the district court ruled that the City
had exceeded its powers by including a strict liability provision
in Section 19-3-9 and held the ordinance unconstitutional.
The City respectfully submits that it is bound by the state
Criminal Code both by the provisions of the Code itself, and by
the declarations of this Court.

Section 76-1-103, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides in relevant part:
"The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any
off~nse defined in this code or • • • any offense
defined outside this code • • • "
This court has previously held that municipalities are
subject to the provisions of the state criminal code.
Larsen, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah, 1976).

Allgood v.

In Allgood, this court struck

down the City's trespass ordinance on the basis that it allowed
imprisonment as·a penalty-·for violation--of ·the·ordinance.

Under

the state criminal code, trespass had been reclassified as an
infraction for which no imprisonment could be imposed.

This

Court held that the City had no power to make trespass a greater
offense than that provided by state law and cited the provisions
of Section 76-1-103, set forth above, as authority for its
holding.
Though the only ordinance before the court was Section
19-3-9, the district court also noted that all of the offenses in
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Chapter 3 of Title 19 of the City's ordinances contained a strict
liability element.

This chapter contains fifteen sections which

all pertain to the regulation and sale of beer. 5

Six of the

provisions specifically pertain to persons under the age of
twenty-one.

These six sections prohibit such persons from being

present on certain premises or portions of premises, where beer
or liquor is served, prohibit the sale of beer to such persons,
and prohibt such persons from having such beverages in their
possession.
The remainder of the ordinances in this chapter pertain to
regulations and conditions upon which beer may be sold, i.e., it
is unlawful to sell beer to an intoxicated person. 6
The district court held that whatever powers the general
welfare clause conferred upon the City, those powers did not
include the right to make a portion of the City's regulations
perta.in ing __,_tQ, beer

~.sales

.. s. tr ic.t 1 i ab.il i ty: ___of fens~s _.~~The__

~is tr

court reasoned:
"If the general welfare clause authorizes cities to
enact such ordinances,, what is to prohibit a city from
making all its offenses 'strict liability offenses',
thereby removing state of mind as a necessary element
in all crimes." p. 5 Memorandum Decision, attached as
Append ix " C" •

5

chapter 3, Title 19, ROSLC is attached as Appendix "F".

6 see Section 19-3-2, ROSLC, in Appendix "F".
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The City submits that the only strict liability offenses it
has enacted are contained in Chapter 3 of Title 19, Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah.

These ordinances, as has

been pointed out, are very narrow in scope and pertain to only a
limited portion of the City's regulations governing the sale of
alcoholic beverages.

The City has recognized these ordinances as

an exception to the general requirement that intent is either
imputed or specifically required in all criminal offenses.
Title 32 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
contains the public offenses relating to peace, morals, property
and conduct of the City, none of which contain a strict liability
provision, nor do any of the other City ordinances involve such a
provision.
The City submits that it is prohibited from including a
strict liability provision in all of its ordinances by the law,

.

as set forth by the United States Supreme Court, c'ited above •
The City readily acknowledges that it could not, has not, and
does not intend to, make all violations of City's ordinances
... _

strict liability offenses.

However, the subject ordinance does

fall within the guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Morissette, supra, for enacting a strict liability
offense:
"The accused, if he does not will the violation,
usually is in a position to prevent it with no more
care than society might· reasonably expect and no more
exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who
assumed his responsibilities.
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"Many statutes which are in the nature of police
regulation, as. this is, impose criminal penalties
irrespective of any intent to violate them;- the purpose
being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation
impossible." Id. at 256, 257.
The City maintains that tavern licensees and their employees
are in positions, whereby with reasonable execution and due care,
they may insure that }?ersons under the age of twenty-one will not_
be allowed to enter such premises.

The burden of so doing is

minimal as compared to the public's interest in regulating
alcohol and protecting minors.
In the instant case, the Defendant-Ronneburg and the
employees under his supervision were admittedly aware of the law
prohibiting under-aged persons from the premises of the tavern.
The defendant had instructed the employees of the tavern to keep
such persons from the tavern premises.

The defendant

a_~d

h_i~

______ _

subordinates were in a position to prevent the offense with no
more care than society might reasonably expect.
The district court has, by implication, ruled the entire
chapter of regulations, pertaining to the sale of beer,
unconstitutional because of the strict liability element included
in each.

The City maintains the district court's decision is

based upon unsound reasoning and should be overturned.
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CONCLUSION
The City respectfully submits that Section 19-3-9, Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City,· Utah, 1965, is constitutional in

all respects.

The ordinance's presumptive validity is sustained

by both specific enabling legislation and by the case law of this

state.

The City has been given both specific and general grants

of authority to regulate the sale of beer, includ.ing its complete
prohibition within the City's jurisdiction . . The enactment of an
ordinance which prohibits under-aged persons from the atmosphere

and elements of premises of bars and taverns is reasonable
exercise of the City's police power.
The City also has specific enabling powers in limited
instances to enact -s·trict liability offenses.

The City has

chosen to do so in regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages and
persons under the age of twenty-one.

Such a limited exercise of

this power__ by_ the _.CLty is_ r_easonable---unde~ - its pol-ice-· power--· and

the cons·ti tutional i ty of the ordinance should be upheld.
DATED

this

--- day

of February, 1982.

ROGER F. CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney

PAUL. G. MAUGHAN
Assistant City Attorney
-Attorney for Appellant
cm31
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APPENDIX "A"

Sec. 19-2-6. Class "C" license. A class "C" retail
license shall entitle the licensee to sell beer on
draft for consumption on or off the premises and to
all the privileges granted the holders of class "A"
and "B" retail licenses in accordance with the liquor
control act of Utah.
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APPENDIX "B"

Sec. 19-3-9. Unlawful to permit minors in certain
establishments.
It shall be unlawful and shall
constitute an offense of strict liability for any
licensee of a class "C", or class "D", license for
the sale of beer or any operator, agent, or employee
of such licensee to permit any person under the age
of twenty-one years to remain in or about such
licensed premises.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.

CASE NO. CRA 81-4

GUY V. RONNEBURG,

Defendant/Appellant.

This case is before this court on appeal from a judgment
of conviction and sentence entered in the Circuit Court, Salt

Lake Department, wherein the defendant was charged with violation
of Section 19-3-9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, the
complaint alleging that on November 6, 1980, the defendant unlawfully permitted or allowed a minor under the age of 21 to remain

in or about a class C tavern licensed to sell beer.

Cheryl D.

Luke, Esq., appearing for Salt Lake City, Plaintiff, and Robert
H. Henderson, Esq., appearing for Guy V. Ronneburg, Defendant.
Upon request, oral argument was heard, following which counsel

were given the opportunity to submit briefs on the question of
the constitutionality_of the ordinance.

-The briefs having been

submitted and considered, the court renders its decision thereon.
In November, 1980, the defendant was employed as the food
and

beve~age

manager at the Ramada Inn.

On November 6, 1980, the

manager of the Inn was away for the day and left defendant in
charge of the Inn as the acting manager.

On that day a regularly

scheduled fashion show took place in the Study Lounge which operated

~ith

a class C beer license.

fashion show was Dusty Larkin,

One of the participants in the

a 19 year old woman.

On the 6th of

November police officers went to the Ramada Inn to investigate a
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complaint that minors were participating in the fashion show.

A police officer talked to Dusty Larkin

in the change room,

determined that she was 19 years old, and when defencant advised
the officer he was in charge of the Inn that evening, the complaint charging him with violation of Section 19-3-9 was filed.
He was tried, convicted and appealed to this court.
That ordinance provides that it shall be unlawful and
"shall consitute an offense of strict liability" for any

l~censee,

or any employee of such licenseeJto permit any person under the
age of 21 years to remain in or about such licensed premises.
Therewasno evidence presented at the trial that defendant knew
on the evening in question that Larkin was under the age of 21
years, but counsel for the city contends that the ordinance being
one of "strict liability", knowledge and intent are not necessary
elements of the offense in question.
under strict liability statutes.

Such appears to be the law·

(21 Aro Jur 2d 169, Sec 89;

Morissette v U.S., 342 U.S. 246; U.S. v Dolterwiech, 320 U.S. 277.)
In People v. Batt.in, __77 Cal App 3rd 635, 95 ALR 3rd 248, the court
noted that strict liability crimes are those which, unlike general
intent and specific ·intent, do not require the union of criminal
acts and criminal intent.

Section 76-2-102, UCA 1953, ·as amended

states that every c:riminal offense "not involving strict liabi_lity"
shall require· a -culpable mental state-.

That --section also states

that an offense shall involve strict liability only when a statute
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to
impose strict liability for the conduct by use of the phrase "strict
liability."

Section 76-2-101 states that no person is guilty of an

offense unless the conduct is prohibited by law and that person
acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with

cri~inal

negli-

gence with respect to each element of the offense as the definition
requires or the acts "constitute an offense involving strict liability."

These provisions apply to state statutes and are not to be

61
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construed as constituting legislative authority to cities or
counties to enact ordinances defining crimes as "strict liability" offenses.

As I see it, the main issue involved in this case is the
constitutionality of the ordinance.

This involves a consideration

of the scope of the offense as well as its "strict liability"

provision.

In her brief, counsel for the city contends that

legislative authority for the city to enact the ordinance in
question is to be found in Sec. 10-8-84, commonly referred to as
the "general welfare clause", which authorizes cities to pass all

ordinances as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety
and preserve the health and promote the prosperity and to improve
the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the

city and the inhabitants thereof.
Counsel cites State v. Hutchinson, decided by the Supreme
Court of Utah on December. 9, 1980, Case No. 16087 as holding that

this general welfare clause is not to be strictly construed and
constitutes legislative authority to enact the ordinance in question.
In Hutchinson the court said:
"The enactment of a broad general welfare clause
conferring police power directly on the counties was
to enable them to act in every reasonable, necessary and
appropriate way to further the public welfare of their
citizens."
It- further stated:.-- -.

"These cases state the rule which we adopt in this
case. When the state has granted welfare power to local
governments, those governments have independent authority
apart from, and in addition to specific grants of authority
to pass ordinances which reasonably and appropriately
related to the objectives of that power, i.e., providing
for the public safety, health, morals and welfare.
(Citation omitted) And the courts will not interfere with
the legislative choice of the means selected unless it is
arbitrary, or is directly prohibited by, or is.inconsistent
with the policy of, the state or federal laws, or the constitution of this state or of the United States. Specific
grants of authority may serve to limit the means available
under the general welfare clause, for some limitation may
be· imposed on the exercise of power by directing the use

6Z

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SALT LAKE (.;!Tl
RONNE BURG

v.
PAGE 4

MEHORANDUM DECISION

of power in a particular manner. But specific grants
should generally be construed with reasonable latitude
in light of the broad language of the general welfare
clause which may supplement the power found in a specific
delegation."
Also:

"County ordinances are valid unless they conflict
with superior law; do not rationally promote the public
health, safety, morals and welfare; or are preempted by
state policy or otherwise attempt to regulate an area
which by the nature of the subject matter itself requires
uniform state regulation. Of course a specific power
delegated to municipalities may imply a restriction upon
the manner of exercise of that power, but the restriction
of the exercise of that power is to be construed to permit
a reasonable discretion and latitude in attaining the
purpose to be achieved".
Section 10-8-47, UCA 1953, contains a· specific grant of
authority to cities to, among other things, prohibit the sale,
giving away or furnishing of intoxicating liquors or narcotics
or tobacco to any person under 21 years of age.

The state legis-

lature expressly has provided that no person shall sell or supply
alcoholic beverage to any person under the age of 21 years,
(Sec. 32-7-15(1)) and also that no person under the age of 21
shall purchase, consume or possess any alcoholic beverage
(Sec.

32-7~15.4).

I have found no statute that prohibits

person~

under 21 from being in or about premises where alcoholic beverages
are sold or consumed.

Indeed, there is no

prohibition under the

state law for children under 18 years of age from being in or about
premises such as restaurants where alcoholic beverages may be
obtained or consumed.
Two things about the ordinance in question trouble me from
a constitutional point of view.

It seems arbitrary and unreason-

able to me for the city to prohibit an adult person under 21 years

'

of age from being in or about a public lounge in a public hotel
merely because the lounge has had a class C beer license issued to
it, particularly where a specific grant of authority is granted to

the city only to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to persons

'•
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Secondly, it is apparent that in Chapter 3 of Title

19 of the city ordinances, all offenses defined therein are given
a "strict liability" element.

As noted, this does away with any

intent as a necessary element.

If the general welfare clause

authorizes cities to enact such ordinances, what is to prohibit
a city from making all.its offenses "strict liability offenses",
thereby removing state of mind as a necessary element.in all crimes.
I do not believe such an ordinance is "reasonably and appropriately
related" to the power to provide for public
and welfare of the people.

safety~

health, morals

I believe that this sort of a "legis-

lative choice" is arbitrary on the part of the city.

I see no

compelling reason making it necessary to make the offense in
question one of strict liability.
I.

I do not believe the broad

interpretation to be given the general welfare clause under the
Hutchinson case extends to such a grant of authority.
For the reasons stated I find the ordinance is unconstitutional and so rule.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit

Court is vacated and the complaint filed in the case is dismissed.
~- ~~

...

Dated this

2 <j

day of July, 1981.

...,_

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

APPENDIX "D"

Sec. 10-8-84. Ordinances--Punishrnent. They may pass
all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations,
not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into
effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred
by this chapter, and such as are necessary and proper
to provide for the safety and preserve the health,
and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace
and good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein; and may enforce obedience to such
ordinances with such fines or penalties as they may
deem proper; provided, that the punishment of any _
offense shall be by fine in any sum not to exceed $299
or by imprisonment not to ~xceed six months, or by ·
both such fine and-_ imprisonrnent.-_:..i ,_
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APPENDIX "E"

Sec. 32-4-17.
Retail licenses--Light beer--Sales
to minors.--(a)
Cities and towns within their
corporate limits, and counties outside of incorporated
cities and towns shall have power to license, tax,
regulate or prohibit the sale of light beer, at retail,
in bottles or draft; provided, that no such licenses
shall be granted to sell beer in any dance hall,
theater or in the pro~imity of any church or school.
The corrunission' granting the :license -shall:.: have ---authority to determine in each case what shall constitute proximity. -

--

-- ·---

(b)
In addition' to other pen-al ties which are~=.:._
provided in this act, the- license of ahy person to
sell light beer shall either be revoked or suspended
for a period of not less than thirty (30) days, upon
conviction of selling or furnishing beer to a minor.
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SectiOns::: -:· :- '

- - ·-· -
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19-3-1. Unlawful to sell beer without license.
19-3-2. Sale to in.toxicated person prohibited.
19-3-3. Advertising sale.
19-3-4. Nuisance prohibited.
19-3-5. Wholesaler and retailer not to have common intere~ts.
19-3-6. _ Minimum light._ajld open yiew- required in li~ens-~d-~prelajses.
19-3-7~ - Sale to minors proh_!bited. __ ==- _ ;_ -_
~<----.--- - -_:__ -~-~ 7- ~---- ~=- -_- 1·9-3-8_ ~-~Pre~ence of minors in certain establishments prohibited~
- '.-~- ~;- ·19;3·~9:;- _. uni~-wfui t~~P~~~t I'Ilin~rs in -cer~i~ '-~stablfshmen-t!i~ ~-~ _· ~- --~ -~~~~;~:-·:;_~1 ~- _19-3-10. Presence of minors ·in portions of certain establi~hments -pr~~==
hibited. --19-3-1 L
Unlawful to permit minors in portions of certian.
establishments.
Possession of beer prohibited to minors. Exception.
19-3-12~
19-3-13. Unlawful to permit intoxicated persons on licensed premises.
19-3-14. Sale or disposition of beer between certain hours unlawful
19-3-15. Entert.ainer regulations.
-_-'"c·:.-

= -·-- - - .. ·-;.:::-:."":.. ; .

--- -

-

--

- -

Oct .• 1976
Aug., 1978
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BEER REGULATIONS

19-3-1-19-3-6

Sec. 19-3-1. Unlawful to sell beer without license. It shall be unlawful and
shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any person to sell beer or to
permit the consumption of beer in any premises unless such premise~ are
licensed for such sale or consumption. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute
an offense of strict liability for any licensee to violate the terms of his license
and it shall be unlawful and constitute an offense of strict liability for any
person, unless he shall be so licensed, to sell bottled, canned or draft beer to
be consumed on the premises.
Sec. 19-3-2. Sale to intoxicated person proluoited. It shall be unlawful and
shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any person to sell beer to any
intoxicated person or to any person under the influence of any intoxicating
beverage.
Sec. 19-3-3. Advertising sale. It shall constitute an offense of strict
liability to violate the provisions of this section. It shall be unlawful to
advertise the sale of light beer except under such regulation as is made by the
liquor control commission of Utah; provided, that one simple designation of
the fact that beer is sold under city license may be placed in or upon the
window or front of the licensed premises which designation shall not exceed
one hundred dollars in cost. No beer, wholesaler, distributor, warehouseman,
or other person shall furnish to any retailer nor shall any retailer display any
sign which shall exceed fifteen hundred squa~e inches in area.
Sec. 19-3-4. Nuisance prohibited. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute
an offense of strict liability for any person to keep or maintain a nuisance as
the same is defined in this title.
Sec. 19-3-5. Wholesaler and retailer not to have common interests. It
shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any
dealer, brewer or wholesaler to either directly or indirectly supply, give or
pay for any furniture, furnishings or fixtures of a retailer, and it shall be
unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any dealer or
brewer to advance funds or money or pay for any license for a retailer or to be
financially interested either directly or indirectly in the conduct or operation
of the business of any retailer.
Sec. 19-3-6. Minimum light and open view required in licensed premises.
It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any
person to own or operate any premises licensed for the sale of beer without
complying with the following lighting and view requirements:

During business hours a minimum of one candle power light
measured at a level of five feet above the floor shall be maintained.
(2) No enclosed booths, blinds, or stalls shall be erected or maintained.
(3) There shall be a clear and unobstructed access. to all portions of the
interior where patrons are permitted or served.
(1)
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April, 1976
April, 1978
Aug., 1978
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19-3·7-19-3-12

INTOXICATING LIQUORS

Sec.19-3-7. Sale to minors prohibited. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability to sell beer to any person under the age of
twenty-one years.
Sec. 19-3-8. Presence of minors in class "C" and class" D" premises prohibited. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability
for any person under the age of twenty-one years to: (a) Enter or be in or about
any premises licerised as a class "C", or class "D" establishment, for the sale
of beer, or (b) To drink beer or any other alcoholic beverages in said licensed
premises. (c) Any person violating any provision of this section shall be
deemed guilty of an infraction and may not be imprisoned, but shall be
punishable by a fine not to exceed $299.
No. 74 , 11 July 1980
Sec. 19-3-9. Unlawful to permit minors in certain establishments. It
shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any
licensee of a class "C", or class "D", license for the sale of beer or any
operator, agent, or employee of such licensee to permit any person under the
age of twenty-one-years to remain in or about such licensed premises.~ -, .
Sec.19-3-10. Presence of minors in or around any lounge or bar area pro-.
hibited. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability
for any person under the age of twenty-one years to: (a) Enter or be in or
around any lounge or bar area in premises licensed with a "club" or
"seasonal" license for the sale of beer, or (b) Be in or around any lounge or
bar area or premises licensed with a liquor consumption license. (c) Any person violating any provision of this section shall be deemed gililty of an infraction and may not be imprisoned, but shall be punishable by a fine not to ·
exceed $299.
·
No. 74, 11 July 1980

Sec. 19-3-11. Unlawful to permit minors in portions of certain
establishments. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict
liability for any licensee of a "club" or "seasonal" license for the sale of beer
or licensee of a liquor consumption license or any operator, agent or
employee of said licensee to have any person under the age of twenty-one
years in or about the lounge or bar area of such licensed premises.
Sec.19-3-12. · Possession of alcoholic beverages prohibited to minors. Exception. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense involving strict
liability for any person under the age of twenty-one years of age to purchase,
accept or have in his or her possession an alcoholic beverage, including beer or
intoxicating liquor; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to: (a)
The acceptance of alcoholic beverages by such person for me~icinal purposes
supplied only by the parent or guardian of such person or the administering
of such alcoholic beverage by a physician in accordance with the law, or (b)
persons under twenty-one years of age who are bona fide employees in class
502

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE
No. 2' of 1911
(Sale OI' diSPOSitbl of beer be~ certain hours unlawful)
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 19-3-U OF
THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY,
UTAH, 1965, RELATING TO
SALE OR DISPOSITION OF
BEER BETWEEN CERTAIN
HOURS UNLAWFUL
Be it ordained by the City
Council of Salt Lake City,

Utah:
SECTION 1. That Section 193-U of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965,
relating to Sale or disµosition
of beer between certain hours
unlawful, be, and the same
hereby is, amended as fol-

lows:

Sec. 19-3-U. Sale or diSPOSk tion of beer between certain -~"
hours unlawful. It shall be_
unlawful and shall constiMe
an offense of strict liability for
any licensee or any employee ""' thereof to sell, diSPOSe,
give away or deliver beer or ,_- -=- _
permit the consumption there-~~_-_--::-,;:. of on the licensed premises - , ~=-::
between the hours of one o'c-- - - ---"·:lock a.m. and seven o'clock - ---~
a.m. on any day from No--~-- --- vember 1 to April 30, inclu- "" slve, or between the hours of

°'

----

two o'clock a.m. and seven

o'clock a.m. of any day from
May 1 to October 31, inclu-

sive, regardless of whether

Daylight Savings Time may
be In force or effect. As an

exception to the foregoing
requirements, beer consum~
tion on the Ileen~ premises
may be permitted until two
o'clock a.m. on New Year's
Day.
- ,.
SECTION 2. This Ordinance
shalt take effect thirty (lO)'
days after its first publication. -- Passed by the City Council:-__
of Salt Lake City, Utah, this
7th day of April, 1981. _-· - -PALMER DePAUus-- .=:: ~
CHAIRMAN ---- --~ATTEST: -=::=::-: KATHRYN MARSHALL
ACTING CITY RECORDER
Transmittal to Mayor on April
1, 1981
Mayors Action:
TED L. WILSON
MAYOR
ATTEST:
KATHRYN MARSHALL
ACTING CITY RECORDER
(SEAL)
BILL NO. 26 of 1981
Published April U, 1981
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19-3-13

BEER REGULATIONS

. .
di h
f th · employment therein or
"A" licensed premises while in the sc arge 0
err
.
.
h 11 b
. 1 ·
· ·on of this section s a
e
thereabouts. Any person v10 ating any provis1 .
.
ed but shall be
deemed guilty of an infraction and may not be impnson '
punishable by a fine not to exceed $299.
No. 74, 11 July 1980
Sec 19-3-13. Unlawful to permit intoxicated persons on the_ lic~ns~~
··
It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of stnct liabiliprem1ses.
hi
t
Ioyees
ty for any person licensed to sell beer or for any of s a~en 8 or emp .
to allow intoxicated persons to remain in or about any licensed prermses.
April, 1976
April, 1978

LIQUOR CONSUMPTION LICENSES
~ ~q,\.

Aug., 1978

19-3-14-19-3-15

.

Sec. 19-3-14.~ Sale or disposition of beer between certain hours unlawful.
It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any
licensee or any employee thereof to sell, dispose, or give away or deliver beer
or permit the consumption thereof on the licensed premises between the
hours of one o'clock a.m. and seven o'clock a.m. on any day from November 1
to April 30, inclusive, or between the hours of two o'clock a.m. and seven
o'clock a.m. of any day from May 1 to October 31, inclusive, regardless of
whether Daylight Savings Time may be in force or effect; provided, however,
that when New Year's Day falls on Monday the_ sale and consumption of beer - ~-~~
on licensed premises may be permitted until three o'clock a.m. of said day as an exception of the foregoing requirement. - __ _
Sec. 19-3-15. Entertainer regulations. It shall be unlawful and shall
constitute an offense of strict liability for any owner, operator, manager,
lessee or licensee, or any agent, employee or person acting with the consent of
such owner, operator, manager, lessee or licensee of any place of business
licensed to sell beer in Salt Lake City, to allow or permit any dancer,
entertainer or other person to appear in or on said place of business naked or
so clothed as to expose in any way the buttocks, genitals, pubic area, or the
female breast of said dancer, entertainer or other person.
It shall also be unlawful and constitute an offense of strict liability for any
such dancer or entertainer or other person to appear in said place of business
naked or so clothed as to expose at any time of appearance the buttocks,
genitals, pubic area or the female breast.
Violations of provisions of this chapter shall be grounds for suspension or
revocation of the license or licenses of the ·establishments where violations
occur.

Chapter4

LIQUOR CONSUMPTION LICENSES
nlawful to allow consumption without license.
prohibited in unlicensed premises.
_ __.,.-:--."'......;-1- __r:yjcense annlication.
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